Shell/flash reports, infrared imagery and analysis of intercepted enemy communications were also used to identify potential enemy targets. Analysis of incoming rocket, mortar and artillery craters determined the likely source of the attacks. Ground and aerial observers supplied visual evidence of enemy activity, as did photoreconnaissance. By Marine estimates, the sensor system provided 40 percent of the raw intelligence at Khe Sanh. This comprehensive sensor system cost approximately $1 billion and was credited with reducing Marine deaths during the fighting by 50 percent. Hundreds of acoustic and seismic sensors were seeded around the combat base. Intelligence was generated locally in many ways. Sources outside the immediate battlefield included intelligence reports from MACV in Saigon, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) headquarters in Da Nang, as well as the headquarters of the 3rd Marine Division at Phu Bai. Various sources were utilized to keep track of enemy activity around the Khe Sanh plateau. S-2 knew the siege strategy employed by the NVA at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Con Thien in 1967, and it could predict the enemy’s actions at Khe Sanh. The effectiveness of the firepower available to the Marines at Khe Sanh was heavily dependent on target selection–a responsibility of the intelligence section (S-2) of the 26th Marine Regiment Headquarters Company. Niagara I was the comprehensive intelligence-gathering effort to pinpoint the available targets, and Niagara II was the coordinated shelling and bombing of these targets with all available air and artillery assets. Niagara would be composed of two elements. According to Westmoreland, the name Niagara invoked an appropriate image of cascading shells and bombs. forces in Vietnam, chose the code name ‘Operation Niagara’ for the coordination of available firepower at Khe Sanh.
The result would be the most spectacular targets of the Vietnam War for American firepower. American tactics were to allow the enemy to surround the 26th Marine Regiment (Reinforced) at Khe Sanh, to mass their forces, reveal troop formations and logistic routes, establish storage and assembly areas, and prepare siege works. By late January 1968, American intelligence sources had detected 20,000 or more NVA soldiers in the vicinity of Khe Sanh.
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